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Abstract
Th e paper explores the relationship of happiness and critique. It is a refl ection on a decade of being trained in 
and practicing philosophical critique. It is a refl ection on experiences I had during teaching on social justice, 
inclusion and diversity; and it is a refl ection on the on-going debate on negative vs. affi  rmative forms of cri-
tique within feminist philosophy. It is also an exercise in imagining a transformation of our critical practices, 
where the embrace of more affi  rmative (rather than destructive-negative) modes of critique does not entail 
overlooking or turning a blind eye to the barriers that unjustly restrain some movements and allow for others' 
privileges to persist. I suggest that a diff ractive approach to critique would allow for joyfully interchanging and 
alternating appropriate modes of debunking, of being the killjoy against sedimentations that weigh some of 
us down, with other modes of critique which allow us to augment and lift up examples of already on-going 
structural change.
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“I am not interested in critique. In my opinion, critique is over-rated, over-emphasized, and 
over-utilized, […]. Critique is all too often not a deconstructive practice […], but a destruc-
tive practice meant to dismiss, to turn aside, to put someone or something down—another 
scholar, another feminist, a discipline, an approach, et cetera. So this is a practice of negati-
vity that I think is about subtraction, distancing and othering.”1
“It is not the time to be over it, if it is not over.”2
1. Introduction
Th e last sentence in Sara Ahmed’s On being included reads: "don’t look over it, if you can’t 
get over it."3 It is this sentence that this essay struggles with; as a refl ection on a decade of 
1 Karen Barad, Rick Dolphijn and Iris van der Tuin, "Matter feels, converses, suff ers, desires, yearns and remembers. 
Interview with Karen Barad," in New Materialism: Interviews & Cartographies. (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities 
Press, 2012), 48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3998/ohp.11515701.0001.001.
2 Sara Ahmed, On being included. Racism and diversity in institutional life (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 
2012), 181. https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822395324.
3 Ibid., 187.
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being trained in and practicing philosophical critique, as a refl ection on experiences I had 
during teaching on social justice, inclusion and diversity, and as a refl ection on the on-going 
debate on negative vs. affi  rmative forms of critique within feminist philosophy. It is also an 
exercise in imagining a transformation of our critical practices where the embrace of more 
affi  rmative (rather than destructive-negative) modes of critique does not entail overlook-
ing or turning a blind eye to the barriers that unjustly restrain some movements and allow 
for others' privilege to persist.
In the beginning of the essay I explore an example from my own teaching practice 
within the school leader program at Stockholm University. In my lectures and workshops 
on diversity work in schools I choose to start from a problematization rather than a cele-
bration of existing pre-conceptions and examples of successful diversity work in Swedish 
schools. Th e emotional responses to the negative-critical approach I choose in these lectu-
res, both my own and the school leaders' moments of discomfort, satisfaction, frustration 
and happiness, serve as an entry point into understanding and motivating why the debate 
within feminist philosophy between proponents of affi  rmative and negative modes of cri-
tique is not just of theoretical, but also of highly practical, pedagogical interest.  
2. Starting with Bouquet V
It is Sara Ahmed’s On being included and some other supplementary texts which I use as a 
springboard for my lectures and workshops on diversity work in schools when teaching in 
one of the mandatory programs for Swedish school leaders. Often I start the lectures with 
a reproduction of Willem de Rooij’s Bouquet V (2010), an artwork which is part of a series 
of bouquets exploring diff erent social and political concepts; Bouquet V being concerned 
with the concept of diversity.4 Th e artist́ s instructions to a fl orist are to arrange 95 dif-
ferent fl owers in a cylindrical vase. Each fl ower is only allowed to occur once and should 
be distinguishable from the other fl owers through their size, color, or texture. Th e fl orist 
in charge of arranging the fl ower bouquet is supposed to avoid any hierarchy in terms of 
colors or through forming a visual center, instead having each and every fl ower be visible in 
its own right. From the challenge of arranging such a fl ower bouquet we then enter a joint 
discussion of the challenges of living up to the ideal of social diversity and justice in school, 
negotiating the tensions between uniqueness and unity, the center and the periphery, of 
norms and margins, of the individual and the collective, of representation and visibility, 
of developing non-hierarchical structures and so on. Following this initial exploration, I 
introduce the concept of intersectionality and how diff erent forms of persistent structural 
discrimination continue to be shown in sociological research on schools, discussing social 
class and cultural capital, gender equality and sexism, ethnicity, cultural background, reli-
gion, ableism, ageism, sexuality, homophobia and transphobia. With the help of readings 
4 Cf. http://www.galeriebuchholz.de/exhibitions/de-rooij-2010/
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of Ahmed ś texts, we later problematize the idea of diversity as a performance indicator in 
Swedish schools, the limits and potential pitfalls of thinking with identity categories (even 
if in an intersectional understanding), the consequences of diversitý s being embodied, and 
the necessity for making diversity more challenging by using "other words alongside this 
word, stickier words […] like ‘racism’, ‘whiteness’ and ‘inequality’."5
Each time I teach in these courses, I get happily surprised at the way in which the enga-
gement with a philosophical text sparks a lively discussion regarding rather practical chal-
lenges of diversity work which the school leaders’ experience as urgent and pressing issues 
in their ordinary, everyday pedagogical routines. Each time I teach these courses, some 
moments of discomfort and happiness, within the audience, within me, and between all of 
us, repeat themselves. Reliably, two or three of the audience members will come up to me 
after the respective session and express their surprise and gratitude for the lecture daring 
to explicitly address and name issues such as racism and whiteness norms that they have 
been struggling with during their own education and also meet in their present educational 
work. Often this is paired with an expression of this being the "fi rst time" they encounter 
a serious critical discussion of these issues within their formal education. As a lecturer, of 
course, these reactions leave me with a mixture of happiness and satisfaction of having 
been able to address someone’s needs, of having been able to ’do’ something for them that 
they experience as valuable, but it also leaves me with a feeling of irritation, frustration, dis-
belief and anger at the fact that some of my students have gone through a good decade of 
higher education and years of teaching practice having been deprived of knowledge which 
they not only have a right to, but which is of vital importance for their own as well as their 
students' well-being. Reliably, at least one audience member, who is privileged regarding 
the larger part of the categories we discuss, will express their astonishment at the fact that 
they never saw a problem or even noticed that women and trans people, people of color, 
non-heteronormative sexualities, non-able-bodied, non-Christian characters are still noto-
riously absent from Swedish school books. Reliably, also, some school leaders express their 
irritation with the apparent lack of appreciation for the positive work that they are already 
practicing. Th is happens mostly during the earlier phases of the sessions, in the moment 
when I choose to start with Ahmed’s critique of the potential pitfalls of diversity instead of 
celebrating achievements of diversity and anti-discrimination work in schools.
How do I defend this decision to fi rst problematize the happy fl ower bouquet vision 
of diversity instead of simply embracing it and going straight towards presenting practi-
cal strategies which have proven successful or could be enhanced to better the present 
situation in education and beyond? Why do I select as a main reading in preparation for 
the seminars Ahmed’s negative-critical analyses of the tendency of diversity documents 
becoming a replacement for actual transformative practice on the ground? Why do I feel 
5 Sara Ahmed, "Embodying diversity: Problems and paradoxes for black feminists," in Race Ethnicity and Education 
12, no. 1 (2009): 44. https://doi.org/10.1080/13613320802650931.
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this is a necessary disclaimer before any lecture on practical strategies of diversity work? 
And why do I, repeatedly, doubt whether this really is the best way to go about things?
It is these refl ections after the lectures and workshops which steer the interest in the 
theoretical debate within feminist theory around diff erent modes of critique; in particu-
lar, the debate between those writers who express frustration with so-called negative (or 
paranoid) critique and call for more affi  rmative (or reparative) forms instead, and others, 
who like Ahmed herself, insist on the persistent urgency of feminists (and others) practicing 
negative critique. When exploring the diff erent approaches to critique, I want to take into 
account my own (sometimes very palpable bodily) exhaustion with the prevalence of cer-
tain forms of negative critique within academia ("our students fi nd themselves so well-trai-
ned in critique that they can spit out a critique with the push of a button"6). Furthermore, 
I also want to refl ect on which kind of reactions and emotional responses are produced in 
these specifi c situations of teaching diversity with Swedish school leaders, and to which 
extent these have potential practical consequences which can transform diversity work in 
schools. 
3. From negativity and paranoia to affi  rmation and reparation 
Before I turn to a closer exploration of my reasons for again and again choosing Ahmed ś 
negative-critical problematization of diversity as an entry in my teaching, I want to spell 
out some of the reasons that I again and again consider as very strong and very valid 
counterarguments against this approach. After many years of reading, writing, and prac-
ticing in a theoretical framework that is situated within a negative-critical tradition, the 
idea of affi  rmative critique as advocated by Rosi Braidotti and many others seems to hold 
a high promise not just in potentially better motivating students, but it also has a strong 
personal appeal for my own living and thinking with a critical practice.  Rather than trying 
to do justice to the many diff erent variations of affi  rmative critique that have been sug-
gested, my intention here is merely to capture the promise and motivation that connects 
these diff erent approaches and has made them attractive as well as bothersome challen-
ges to the way I have been practicing critique. In this spirit, I think it is helpful to start by 
considering the distinction between paranoid and reparative modes of reading as promi-
nently developed in the early 1990́ s by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick in her article "Paranoid 
Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid You Probably Th ink Th is Essay Is 
About You.“7 Sedgwick's distinction between paranoid and reparative modes of critique 
can roughly be mapped onto the more recent debate between negative vs. affi  rmative 
critique, and the article gives a very convincing, entertaining, joyful, and acute analysis of 
6 Barad et al., Matter feels, converses, suff ers, 48.
7 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, "Paranoid Reading and reparative reading, or, yoú re so paranoid, you probably think 
this essay is about you," in Touching Feeling (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 123-151. https://doi.
org/10.1215/9780822384786-005.
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the "paranoid character" of critical habits equally prevalent in Marxist, deconstructive, psy-
choanalytic, feminist and queer traditions. 
Following Paul Ricoeur’s notion of the "hermeneutics of suspicion," Sedgwick uses the 
notion of paranoia to describe, or better to diagnose, a form of critical practice that since 
Marx, Freud and Nietzsche is concerned with false consciousness and deciphering hidden 
truths, which anticipates the future in a way that is resistant to surprise and understands 
its object of critique (its enemy) through mimicry, and understands knowledge as having 
to do with exposure, demystifi cation and "unveiling hidden violence."8 Th e paranoid mode 
of critique is not only aiming at a theory which in its strong predictive and explanatory 
claims tries to preemptively safeguard against surprises (bad or good), but it also excludes 
potential alternative interpretations and futures through its fi xation on negative aff ects 
and their avoidance. 
Sedgwick ś central point is not admonish the critic to abandon the paranoid mode, but 
she wants to remind us of other possible modes of reading which produce other eff ects, 
most prominently what she, following psychoanalyst Melanie Klein, calls a ŕeparativé  
mode:
“Because there can be terrible surprises, however, there can also be good ones. Hope, often 
a fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience, is among the energies by which the repa-
ratively positioned reader tries to organize the fragments and part-objects she encounters 
and creates. Because the reader has room to realize that the future may be diff erent from the 
present, it is also possible for her to entertain such profoundly painful, profoundly relieving, 
ethically crucial possibilities as that the past, in turn, could have happened diff erently from 
the way it actually did.”9
It is important to note that Sedgwick ś critique of the limits of the paranoid mode of cri-
tique and her plea to recall other possibilities should not be understood as a call for aban-
doning the critique of structural power or as opening a binary contrast of paranoid and 
reparative forms of critique. As Heather Love emphasizes, “what the essay argues, and what 
it performs, is the impossibility of choosing between them.”10 In a similar vein, Robyn Wieg-
man has read the “reparative turn”11 in queer feminist theory following Sedgwick’s essay 
“not as an alternative to critique but as a means to compensate for its increasingly dama-
ged authority.”12 She connects this damaged authority of critique to the growing insecurity 
amongst in particular left-oriented critical theorists about the potential of scholarly know-
8 Sedgwick, "Paranoid reading," 140.
9 Ibid., 146.
10 Heather Love, "Truth and consequences. On paranoid reading and reparative reading," Criticism 52, no. 2 (2011), 
239. https://doi.org/10.1353/crt.2010.0022.
11 Robyn Wiegman, "Th e times we’re in: Queer feminist criticism and the reparative ‘turn’," Feminist Th eory 15, no. 
1 (2014), 4-25. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700113513081a.
12 Wiegman, "Th e times we’re in," 7.
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ledge to lead to social transformation and provide society with an idea of “what to do.”13 
Th e reparative mode is thus understood as a way to break with the internal logic of para-
noia, about remembering that “it can seem realistic and necessary to experience surprise”14 
and “about learning how to build small worlds of sustenance that cultivate a diff erent pre-
sent and future for the losses that one has suff ered.”15 Th is discussion following Sedgwick ś 
essay has been working out rather carefully that paranoid and reparative reading should 
be understood as diff erent but inter-related impulses that each in their turn open diff erent 
possibilities for critique, rather than fi guring as two mutually exclusive modes or strategies 
between which we need to decide or where one should replace the other once and for all. 
It is useful to keep these points in mind when we now turn to the debate between propo-
nents of negative and affi  rmative critique respectively, a debate which has received some 
prominence in educational research and which parallels the discussion on paranoia and 
reparation following Sedgwick ś essay in queer cultural studies in important ways.
One of the main points of concern in these debates is with the backward-looking orien-
tation of approaches employing the modus of critique that is called negative. As educatio-
nal theorist Dorthe Staunæs writes:
”Many critical analyses regard contemporary tendencies as negative. Th ey are retrospec-
tively oriented and sometimes infl uenced by a certain sense of resentment for the present 
and longing for a retropia; an utopia of what once (never) was. Th e danger of this way of 
conducting critique is that it only refl ects or you could say mirror what is already there. What 
this methodology allows us to see is what we already see, but now in a reversed version.”16
Instead of creatively producing diff erent and new ideas and outlooks, negative critique 
reproduces that which we already know, that which is already existing, even if it points 
towards its negative impacts and consequences. Instead of focusing on describing the pro-
blematic marginalization and forms of repression in present power structures, affi  rmative 
critique analyzes present "tendencies with the purpose of reconfi guring the world;"17 it is 
"curious"18 and points out "what could be diff erent."19 Importantly, Staunæs also stresses 
that affi  rmative critique is not about discarding a critical analysis of power but affi  rma-
tive critique is a necessary "supplement"20 which still confronts power "norm-critically;"21 
however, it is "not a matter of judging or voting for or against," but in Harawaý s spirit it is 
13 Ibid.
14 Sedgwick, Paranoid reading, 145.
15 Wiegman, "Th e times wé re in," 11.
16 Dorthe Staunæs, "Notes on inventive methodologies and affi  rmative critiques of an aff ective edu-future," Research 
in Education 0, no. 0 (2016): 5. 





89Schumann: On Happiness and Critique
a matter of "producing possible élsewheres.́ "22 In this way, Staunæs follows Foucault́ s call 
for a suspension of judgment when he refl ects on how to properly analyze the nexus bet-
ween power and knowledge in his famous essay "What is Critique?" and writes, "there is no 
case made here for the attribution of legitimacy, no assigning points of error and illusion."23 
She also follows Brian Massumi who describes the choice between ´debunkinǵ  an ´foste-
rinǵ  as a "strategic question"24 and as a "question of dosage."25 Th e logic behind the choice 
of which mode to apply is rather straightforward: "It is simply that when you are busy criti-
quing you are less busy augmenting."26 Negative critique fi xates on and thus reproduces its 
object of critique, rather than positively focusing on and augmenting alternatives which we 
can already decipher in the presence or imagine in a possible future. As network theorist 
Bruno Latour in his polemic essay "Why has critique run out of steam?" holds against con-
ventional critical theory, the transformative power of critique lies not so much in its getting 
"matters of fact" right, but in engaging creatively and in a careful and cautious manner with 
"matters of concern."27 Th e task and the strength of the critic is then redefi ned by him as 
follows: "Th e critic is not the one who debunks, but the one who assembles. Th e critic is 
not the one who lifts the rugs from under the feet of the naive believers, but the one who 
off ers the participants arenas in which to gather."28 On the other hand, Latour himself is not 
so careful in his treatment of those traditions he criticizes and tends to contrast "debun-
king" with "assembling" in a manner that itself comes rather close to ´debunking,́  not 
dissimilar to the kind of revelatory, negative form of critique he describes as problematic.
In the interest of not reproducing this kind of dismissive technique, operating by 
creating dichotomous oppositions to that which we criticize, I think it is more fruitful to 
follow Staunaes and other educational thinkers which promote a less polemic and a more 
varied and fi ne-grained picture of how we can think diff erent modes of critique. Hillevi 
Lenz Taguchi, for example, agrees with Rosi Braidotti that "feminisms need to move away 
from the logic of negativity built into the Hegelian-Marxist dialectics of consciousness in 
critical theory […] as well as in the central notion of lack in psychoanalysis," as this logic 
will "always require experiences of material, discursive or sexual oppression, marginality, 
injury or trauma, as a condition of resistance, counteraction and overturning."29 Th e form 
of "diff ractive analysis," however, which Lenz Taguchi suggests as an alternative, building on 
Karen Barad (2007) and Donna Haraway (1997), implies moving "from identifying bodies as 
22 Ibid.
23 Michel Foucault, "What is critique?," in Th e Politics of Truth (Cambridge, MA and London: semiotext(e), 1997), 60.
24 Brian Massumi, Parables for the virtual. Movement, aff ect, sensation (Durham: Duke University Press,  2002), 14. 
https://doi.org/10.1215/9780822383574 
25 Massumi, Parables, 12.
26 Ibid.
27 Bruno Latour, "Why has critique run out of steam? From matters of fact to matters of concern," Critical Inquiry 30 
(2004), 225-248. https://doi.org/10.1086/421123 
28 Latour, Why has critique, 246.
29 Hillevi Lenz Taguchi, "A diff ractive and Deleuzian approach to analyzing interview data," Feminist Th eory 13, no. 3 
(2012), 269. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700112456001.
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separate entities with distinct border to think in terms of entanglements and interdepen-
dences in processes of ongoing co-constitutive co-existence of diff erent kinds of bodies" as 
well as "thinking as a process of co-constitution, investigating the entanglement of ideas 
and other materialities in ways that refl exive methodologies do not."30 Th e gesture here is 
still motivating diff ractive modes of critique in relation to that which was left out in earlier 
forms of critique (e.g. the activeness of matter and its involvement in the co-constituting 
rather than just passive instruments); "that which has been considered passive and minor 
is now seen as active and forceful in its into-activities with other bodies."31 Yet, the gesture 
nevertheless construes these as complementary forms, and not necessarily as a radically 
new method to fully replace negative or refl exive modes of critique. In line with Barad and 
Haraway, Lenz Taguchí s understanding of diff ractive analysis extends beyond the refl exive 
mode and focuses on diff erence in a positive sense, on the way in which diff erences come 
to matter and become productive and eff ective in the world, without the (patriarchal, 
colonial) gesture of trying to assimilate, eradicate or sublate diff erences in a Hegelian dialec-
tic. Furthermore, the turn to the material does not minimize the question of responsibility, 
but it is "simultaneously about intervention and invention; responsibility and ethics."32 So, 
when looking at how affi  rmative critique and diff raction as a mode of analysis are put into 
practice in educational research, in the best cases the extension of researchers' focus on lif-
ting the importance of our embodiment as well as on the active involvement of materiality 
in the respective phenomena or events studied, should lead to an actual deepening of the 
critique, to developing critique that cuts deeper and develops further transformation than 
more traditional radical critiques; it should inspire a critique that goes more "minoritarian" 
(Deleuze) and develops even more challenging, more dangerous analyses. 
4. Returning the feminist killjoy
In 2008 Sara Ahmed wrote a noticed response in the European Journal of Womeń s Stu-
dies that opened a critical questioning of some of the "founding gestures" of new mate-
rialism.33 She particularly took issue with new materialistś  "routinization of the gesture 
towards feminist anti-biologism or constructionism,"34 constructing the claim for off ering 
something new through a call for a return to biology, a return to matter which, accor-
ding to Ahmed, only functioned through "a forgetting as well as a caricature."35 For her, a 
tendency to caricature rather than critically engage with feminism ś history goes against 




33 Sara Ahmed, "Some Preliminary Remarks on the Founding Gestures of the ‘New Materialism’," European Journal of 
Women Studies 15, no.1 (2008), 23-39. https://doi.org/10.1177/1350506807084854 
34 Ibid., 25.
35 Ibid., 36.
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carefully do we engage with feminism ś history? How much attention and care do texts by 
male philosophers receive?36 Another problematic she points out in new materialistś  claim 
to newness, is the omission of historical materialism, which "does not haunt this emergent 
fi eld even in its absence."37 An anecdote from last yeaŕ s NERA conference in Copenha-
gen (2017) comes to my mind here. I attended a panel on an upcoming book project on 
new materialist research methodologies. In the question section after the presentations, 
the diff erent participants of the panel were asked to outline how their respective projects 
related to questions of ṕolitical economy.́  Th e fi rst answer from one of the panelists was 
Í am not familiar with the concept̀ . While the other panelists later on developed some 
quite interesting answers as to how the question of political economy would be addressed 
in their respective project, this fi rst answer struck me quite uncomfortably. What is the 
state of social research and scholarship if currently active members of the community are 
unfamiliar with the concept of political economy or fi nd it laughable enough to dismiss it 
as a joke? 
In this kind of context, Ahmed ś work tends to fi gure as the kind of feminist killjoy 
which she has spent ample time motivating and defending as one of the key fi gures for 
an important and necessary feminist critique of happiness.38 According to Ahmed, kee-
ping categories such as gender and race in place as critical analytical categories will never 
be considered as laughably outdated by those who experience the eff ects of structural 
oppression in their everyday lives: 
“In giving up these terms, we give up more than the terms: we give up on a certain kind of 
intervention into the world. […] Th e very tendency to ´look oveŕ  how everyday and insti-
tutional worlds involve restrictions and blockages is how those restrictions and blockages 
are reproduced. It is not the time to be over it, if it is not over. It is not even the time to get 
over it. Social categories are sediments: they go all the way down, and they weigh some of 
us down.”39
Furthermore, when Ahmed defends the fi gure of the feminist killjoy as a necessary critique 
of happiness, she – amongst many other aspects – also positions this critical fi gure against 
Rosi Braidotti’s call for a more affi  rmative rather than negative critical practice in feminist 
theory:
“Rosi Braidotti has suggested that the focus on negativity has become a problem within 
feminism. She off ers a rather bleak reading of bleakness: 'I actively yearn for a more joyful 
and empowering concept of desire and for a political economy that foregrounds positivity, 
not gloom'. Th e call for affi  rmation rather than negativity in her work involves an explicit 
36 Cf. Ibid., 30.
37 Ibid., 32.
38 Sara Ahmed, Th e promise of happiness (Duke University Press: Durham and London, 2010). https://doi.
org/10.1215/9780822392781.
39 Ahmed, On being included, 181.
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turn to happiness. As she argues: 'I consider happiness a political issue, as are well-being, 
self-confi dence and a sense of empowerment. Th ese are fundamentally ethical concerns. […] 
Th e feminist movement has played the historical role of placing these items at the centre of 
the social and political agenda: happiness as a fundamental human right and hence a politi-
cal question'. My desire is to revitalize the feminist critique of happiness as a human right and 
as the appropriate language for politics. To revitalize the critique of happiness is to be willing 
to be proximate to unhappiness.”40
I would like to consider Ahmed's fi gure of the feminist killjoy in relation to the debate 
between affi  rmative and negative critique; namely, that sometimes there are things more 
important than happiness.
Holding on to certain forms of negative critique (such as in relation to political eco-
nomy or historical materialism; or in more traditional critiques of sexism and racism) might 
be worthwhile even if they do not promise or guarantee to make us (the scholar, the resear-
cher, or their audience) happy. In her 2010 Th e promise of happiness, Ahmed motivates the 
fi gure of the feminist killjoy both from the liberal feminist criticism of many ideas of hap-
piness actually being instrumental in the oppression of women, as well as from the black 
feminist critique of these ideals of happiness as a "political myth"41 which reserves hap-
piness and its approximation for white women, imagining black women as always already 
falling on the unhappy side of life for lack of the pre-conditions that would make a happy 
life possible. Interestingly, Ahmed ascribes education a central place in the construction 
of these ideals of happiness. Education, as an "orientation device,"42 has since Jean-Jacques 
Rousseaú s Émile attempted at orienting women to understand their happiness in suppor-
ting and aligning themselves with the happiness of others. It has been feministś  critique 
of these educationally enforced ideals or women fi nding their happiness in pleasing their 
parents, their husbands, their children, that from Mary Wollstonecraft onwards have been 
considered "troublesome" since they pose an immediate threat towards the happiness of 
others. Ahmed positively takes up feminism ś "history of making trouble"43 through its vio-
lation of "the fragile conditions of peace"44 not only for its destruction of false and oppres-
sive ideals, but also in its opening for broader, other images. Th e construction of womeń s 
happiness, as for example in Rousseau, was often related to a "renunciation of desire."45 
Th e feminist critique of happiness thus could have a freeing eff ect, by allowing women to 
dream of following their desire beyond narrow visions of happiness, beyond what would 
make them the ǵood girĺ  in they eyes of others, beyond what would fi rst and foremost 
serve others' happiness.
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Yet, it is not that feminism ś promise of happiness that Ahmed is interested in or even 
convinced of; (as when she writes, "making women happy is not the point of feminism."46) 
Rather, it is a re-appraisal of the critical practice of "consciousness-raising"47 that remains 
Ahmed ś main point of interest:
“Feminist consciousness can thus be thought of as consciousness of the violence and power 
that are concealed under the languages of civility and love, rather than simply consciousness 
of gender as a site of restriction of possibility.”48
It is through the dismantling of the misleading, false, and oppressive ideals of happiness, so 
Ahmed, that it is possible to counter a pervasive logic of misunderstanding the "angry black 
woman" or the "feminist killjoy" as the source of the problem, as someone causing trouble 
because they are angry, rather than as someone who is angry because there is a problem: 
“Your anger is a judgment that something is wrong. But in being heard as angry, your speech 
is read as motivated by anger. Your anger is read as unattributed, as if you are against x 
because you are angry rather than being angry because you are against x.”49
Th is kind of logic falls into place when "an oppressed person does not smile or show signs 
of being happy, then he or she is read as being negative: as angry, hostile, unhappy, and so 
on,"50 and it is particularly vicious for the "angry black woman" who may "even kill femi-
nist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics."51 Rather 
than drawing attention to and being read as a call to address and transform the structural 
inequalities and oppressions they name, the killjoy is attributed with an individual, angry 
personality that unpleasantly destroys the otherwise good mood of the situation.
5. Instead of a conclusion: Sediments that go all the way down
Returning to the debate between affi  rmative and negative critique, it is interesting to see 
how Ahmed connects her insights from her study of diversity work in higher education 
institutions with the recent critique of more traditional forms of feminist and post-colonial 
critique in On being included (2012). Ahmed here defends traditional terrains of critical prac-
tices, such as situated knowledges̀  understanding of providing a more adequate account 
of the world by pointing to the ways in which racism and sexism develop as structural 
problems, and claims that her phenomenological approach can show "how a critique of the 
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ontological basis of categories does not mean that the categories themselves disappear."52 
She argues that the new materialist claim to re-doing our ontology covers over rather than 
transforms the inequalities of our practices in a similar way as in her research some insti-
tutions understood diversity work as changing the "perception of whiteness rather than 
changing the whiteness of the organization."53 She cautions that:
”To proceed as if the categories do not matter because they should not matter would be to 
fail to show how the categories continue to ground social existence. […] Th e very idea that 
we are beyond race, that we can see beyond race, or that we are óver racé  is how racism is 
reproduced it is how racism is looked over. […] At the very moment of óvering,́  a category 
is redone.”54 
Th e diffi  culty of not blaming those who continue pointing at the problem as the ones 
causing (or at least perpetuating) the problem, then poses itself for these internal feminist 
debates. In Ahmed ś view, those that are painted as holding on to "dated"55 forms of cri-
ticism, to social categories which new ontologies can reveal as without good grounding, 
might be the ones that are angry because they continue to experience a problem, because 
they continued to be weighed down by certain inequalities and categories more heavily 
than others, rather than being those that continue to experience a problem because they 
decide to remain angry.
In a rather refreshing engagement with these criticisms of new materialism, Peta Hinton 
and Xin Liu develop an approach which openly embraces this problematic as a charge to 
be taken seriously, rather than defensively negated: "'Yes, new materialism contains a white 
optics'. 'Yes, it might generate, or generate as, a white episteme'. One only has to look at 
the new materialist canon and its genealogical informants for evidence of this – Braidotti, 
Barad, DeLanda, Deleuze, just to name a few."56 However, Hinton and Liu suggest that new 
materialism’s "perverse ontology" makes abandonment "im/possible," i.e. it embraces the 
paradox of abandoning and refusing to abandon at the same time,57 whereas the critics of 
new materialist critique do not admit in equal manner to their own forms of abandonment 
and omission. To this, I would like to return once more with Ahmed that there is something 
worrisome in stylizing diff erence as something that "just was or even is,"58 that "the desire 
for Deleuze, which is not necessarily Deleuzian […] can be questioned in part because it 
allows scholars to by-pass certain political questions and categories; it might be 'desirable' 
52 Ahmed, On being included, 182.
53 Ibid., 184.
54 Ibid., 182 f.
55 Ibid., 181.
56 Peta Hinton and Xin Liu, "Th e im/possibility of abandonment in new materialist ontologies," Australian Feminist 
Studies 30, no. 84 (2015), 130. https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2015.1046304.
57 Cf. Ibid., 141.
58 Salla Tuori and Salla Peltonen, "Feminist politics. An Interview with Sara Ahmed," NORA - Nordic Journal of 
Womeń s Studies 15, no. 4 (2007), 259. https://doi.org/10.1080/08038740701691941 
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for some to talk more about becoming molecular than about whiteness, for instance."59 
Instead she highlights the importance of structural distributions and inequalities, which 
require scholarly attention, understanding and the tracing of their historical development 
so as "not to take the social categories as given but to track how they come into being as 
eff ects of processes."60 I am thinking of Clare Hemmings' self-critical engagement with the 
opposition between paranoia and reparation: 
“Is it accidental, I wonder, that I fi nd myself most drawn to thinking through aff ect rather 
than critique at a point when it is institutionally harder and harder to sustain a paranoid 
position invested in (my own) marginality? Th at I turn to memory and fantasy intellectually 
and invest heavily in a body that feels good (running-yoga-rest; running-yoga-rest) at the 
same time that I am recognized by an elite institution as a professor? And indeed that I am 
not the only one thus drawn to a move away from paranoia at precisely the moment when 
it would be absurd to keep on insisting on constraining structures (while taking a nice long 
period of research leave)? To what or whom is reparation being made here? To the instituti-
ons one previously critiqued? To the misguided earlier self mired in paranoia?”61
Th is is what Ahmed means when she writes that: “Social categories are sediments: they go 
all the way down, and they weigh some of us down.”62 For some, critique is optional, for 
others it is not; and we can wonder with Hemmings how to think about the line between 
the charge of paranoia and the weight of the actual constraint some bodies (in certain con-
texts, times, places) experience more than others, and how this connects to the diff erent 
critical impulses (negativity, paranoia, affi  rmation, reparation) that urge diff erent bodies to 
produce diff erent kind of scholarship and research at diff erent times and places.
In many ways, the impulses from affi  rmative critique seem to hold promise for addres-
sing the challenges of diversity work in schools in a diff erent, more productive manner. 
Rather than reproducing problematic categories and boundaries, we think beyond human-
non-human and address the world shaping and co-creating surprising new and diff erent 
realities. With Ahmed, however, one also feels obliged to caution against these promises 
of happiness. In a reality where basic issues of recognition and representation in school 
leadership itself, in the power hierarchies within schools, regarding personnel and staff  as 
well as students, regarding the teaching material and curricula, remain under-theorized and 
are not taken into adequate account, embracing affi  rmative critique can too easily lead to 
a comfortable silencing of issues that still need addressing and clear naming. I have been 
trying to argue in this paper that we need not think of affi  rmative and negative critique 
as two binaries; opposed and mutually exclusive alternatives. Instead, and in a more dif-
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 260.
61 Clare Hemmings, "Th e materials of reparation," Feminist Th eory 15, no. 1 (2014), 29. https://doi.
org/10.1177/1464700113513082.
62 Ahmed, On being included,  181.
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fractive spirit, we should multiply diff erent modes of critique and employ them in their 
overlapping and intersecting characters. In this way, we might achieve multiple ways of 
engaging with diff erent forms of critique of persistent oppression and marginalization in 
schools which can lead to a thorough transformation of current practice. A diff ractive 
approach to critique would allow for joyfully interchanging and alternating appropriate 
modes of debunking, of being the killjoy against sedimentations that weigh some of us 
down, with other modes of critique which allow us to augment and lift up positive examp-
les of emancipatory and liberating diversity practice which illustrates creative and already 
on-going structural change.
